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"Thus my ctment argument," writes Keith Jenkins in his "Postmodern 
Reply" reply to Perez Zagorin's critique of postmodernism that appeared 
in a recent issue of History and Theory, "is that we might now begin to 
forget hi storical discourses of the past and begin to live amid the ample 
and agreeable imaginaries provided by postmodern-type theorists ... " 1 
Then Jenkins, who in this article and in recent books stridently positions 
himself as an advocate of the new way, fires off a dazzling barrage from 
the postmodernist canon: Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Der-
rida, Julia Kristeva, and others. These thinkers can, he believes, "gen-
erate enough emancipatory rhetorics to eliminate any further ki nd of 
foundational or non-foundational past."2 This "Reply" to Zagorin -
I. Keith Jenkins. "A Postmodern Reply to Pere?. Zagorin ," Hi.1·1111y a 11rl ThPnl)' 39 (?000), 18 1-200. Quo-
tation, J 99. This is a response to Perez Zagorin, "History, the Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on l'ost-
modernism Now," His!Ut)' and Them )• 38 ( 1999), 1-24. 
2. "Postmodern Reply,'' 199. Jenkin 's book, Why Histot)•?: Elhics a11d Pos1111odernity (London, 1999). is a 
much-expanded version of the arguments he makes in "Postmodern Reply." In the present "Response" I gen-
erally confi ne myself to Jcnkin 's essay, but occasionally comment upon the book too. He has also ed ited The 
Post111odemist History Reader (London, 1997) 
Jenkin 's adulation of the postmdernist canon of great thinkers is especially sttiking in IVl1y Ni.<t01y. He 
unreflexively utilizes modernist assumptions to inform us that in the last two and a half thousand years 'The 
Western tradition ... produced in that time some fifteen to twenty intellectual giants ... " However, the last few 
decades of our own century a lone, the group of postmodern intel lectuals ("the phenomenon of publicly avail-
able ime llectual brilliance") has " unc.lermincc.l , reworked aml gone beyond the whole of that Western ta-
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"overtly positioned," in Jenkins 's own words; "polemical" in mine - is 
always powerful. And, even to a fairly traditional narrative historian such 
as myself, it is at times eye-opening and instructive.3 Jenkins argues, 
firstly, that Zagorin - and by implication "traditional" modernist histo-
rians in general - badly misinterprets crucial postmodernist ideas. And 
that, secondly, had he understood postmodernism "correctly," Zagorin 
would have even been more shocked by its implications for history as a 
discipline which assumes a real past independent of language, a past that 
historians can at least partly reconstruct through empirical research. 
In his "Rejoinder" to Jenkins' s "Reply," Zagorin ably defends his posi-
tion, and needs little help from me.4 However, I want to use Jenkins's 
polemic, different perhaps only in degree of zeal from similar attacks on tra-
ditional academic history, as an opportunity to constructively critique such 
attempts by postmoderni sts to undermine the espistemological assump-
tions of my discipline. I openly concede that, as believers in the use of clear, 
"simple" language and of "common sense" explanations, many of us aca-
demic historians do need to re-examine our assumptions. Yet I will argue 
that Jenkins and similar postmodernist proselytisers too often subvert their 
own arguments. Presenting examples from, especially, American historical 
studies, I will show that traditional academic history is by no means as stati c 
or as "unemancipated" as these postmodernists appear to believe. 
Although broadly in agreement with much of Zagorin's "Rejoinder" to 
Jenkins, I do not accept it all. Zagorin appears to believe more than I in 
the possibility of historians achieving some degree of truthful reconstruc-
tion of the past. I believe only in historical truth as a worthy but unattain-
able goal; all we can hope for are tentative but demonstrably credible 
constructions. And I feel that even " traditional" historians can and indeed 
dition." We "arc lucky, we /life twe111iet/J-ce111111y lesser mortals [emphasis added], lo be alive in this culture to 
witness this," Why Histo1y, 3 1-32 ... For an excellent criti4ue (review) of this book see Robert Anchor, "On 
How to Kick the History Habit and Discover That Every Day in Every Way, Things are Gelling Meta and 
Meta and Meta ... " Histmy and Themy40: I (Feb. 2001): 104-1 6. 
3. Jn case! appear biased in my use of the term "polemica l," it is worth quoting Jenkins's description of his 
book: "This book is written as an extended polemic; it is overly positioned. It may be impossible to write 
today in any other way. The idea of writing an objective, neutral , disinterested text, where explaining, 
describing and 'introducing' something is done from a position that is n' t os tensibly a position at all, is a naive 
one ... The text is thus polemical and partisan .. ., Wiry H i.m11y, 1. On both counts - that his book is a polemic, 
and that all writing is "positioned" - I agree w ith Jenkins. And J think that his ai1icle is eljually polemical. 
4. Perez Zagorin, "Rejoinder to a Postmodernist," Hi.Ho1y and 711eo1)' 39 (2000), 201-209. 
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have learnt from many of the sub-streams within the broad ri ver of so-
called "postrnodernism." We especially need to be more reflexive and 
self-critical in our epistemology, methodologies, and language. We need 
to jettison what remains of our claim to posses a dispassionate and neu-
tral gaze upon the past, when we are, to use the postmodernist term, 
always "located" in gendered, cultural, and ideological positions. Our 
perspectives are always to some degree political. Historians, especially, 
should develop greater awareness that the supposedly neutral scientific 
methodology we espouse is itself, as Jenkins validly notes, historical; 
that our "scholarly" approach to evidence and explanation is itself the 
product of certain modern (perhaps fifteenth to twenty-first century) 
assumptions about reality. We have no right to assume that this is the only 
way of achieving knowledge about the past. And as Hayden White, most 
famously, and others have argued, the very stories we construct may 
unknowingly call upon or fall into narrative structures and patterns 
deeply engrained in the Western psyche; rather than being "inherent in 
the evidence," our supposedly original and neutral nan-ati ves may actu-
ally be "in our minds" first, and then imposed upon that evidence. As his-
torian Karen Halttunen concedes, a major problem "is that we craft our 
narratives without acknowledging that we do so - masking the represen-
tational as ref erential " (emphasis added). The simplest solution, she 
believes, "is to practice self-reflexivity, acknowledging the fictive quality 
of our work and openly revealing our chosen tropes and metanmrntive 
that shape it." Yet simple self-refl exi vity may not be enough, she fears. 
Perhaps the deepest problem is "our unvarying adoption of nineteenth-
century realism for all our histmical accounts." Only a willingness to 
experiment with new narrative forms may save us from this stasis.5 
5. Karen Halttunen, "Cul rural History and the Challenge of Narrativity," in Beyond the Cultural 'film: New 
Directions in the S11uly of Society and Culture. eds. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, 1999), 166-
67. Many of the essays in this excellent collection bear on the issues l discuss here. For connicting views on 
these issues, see also: GeotTrey Roberts, ed., The Histm)• and Narrative Reader (London, 200 I). Major studies 
critical of so-called traditional history: Hayden White, Figural Realism: St11die.1· in tlie Mimesis Effect (Balti-
more, 1999); and The Content of the Form: Narrative Disco11rse and Historical Representation (Princeton, 
1987); Robert F. Berkhofcr, Jr., Beyond the Great Story: History as Text tmd Discourse (Camhridgc, Mas-
sachusetts, t 995); Elizabeth Deeds Ermath, Seq11el tu Histm)•: Po.1·tmodem ism and the Crisis of Histuricul 
Time (Princeton, 1992). For a sense of how practitioners of United States History have incorporated or resisted 
postmodernist thinking, see many of the essays in Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Woods, eds., Imagined His-
tories: American f-lisrorians and the Past (Princeton, 1998). T'or example, Linda Kerber, "Gender," esp. 46-53. 
50 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 34, 2002 
Yet Jenkins and other critics of more traditional history often violate a 
cardinal value of their own postmodernism, the need to dissolve binary 
and polarized thinking. They appear to assume that, because history 
cannot objectively reconstruct the past (how many contemporary histo-
rians would claim it does?) then histo1y is 111.erely one story among 1nany, 
·with no greater claim to credibility than any other kind of story. I argue 
here that academic history can - should - renounce all claims to objective 
truth, yet retain its claim to providing us with varying degrees of credi-
bility in its constructions of the past. For example, could any scholar or 
non-scholar seriously claim that the following two "stori es" are equally 
credible or incredible? 1) From the late fifteenth century Europeans 
began to colonize the Americas. 2) From the late fifteenth century, 
Aztecs and other peoples of the Americas began to colonize Europe. 
Analysis of surviving evidence allows traditional historians to draw 
always-tentative conclusions not about the objective truth but about the 
credibility of such and other stories. By 2001 CE few of us claim much 
beyond this. In other words, it is not, as Jenkins and such postmoderni st 
advocates would have us believe, an either/or situation. There are 
infinitely numerous possibilities between (unattainable) objectively true 
reconstructions of the past and - at the other extreme - the claim that all 
stories are equally credible or incredible. The academic historian 's self-
assumed task is to help us tentatively decide between conflicting credi-
bility claims in viewing the past.6 
6. Other historians have noted such resort to dichotomising: for example, Noel Carroll. "Jnterprctation, 
History, and Narrative," in Roberts, ed., Hislury and Narm1ive Reade1; 2541T. Postmodernist critiques of 
academic history are, o f course, only pan o f a broader attack on the whole empirical tradition o r the 
Enlightr.nmP.nl - indeed on all forms or Western science, ··soft'' and "hart! ." For a carerul hut powerful epis-
temological defence of Western science against extre me social constructionist views, see Christopher 
Norris, J\f!ain.~I Relaliviry: l'!tilosopliy of' Science, Deco11.\"/ntclion and Cri1ical Theo1y ( 19 97). And for a 
de fense of the scientific method in anthropology, see Marvin Han-is, Tlteories <if C11l111re i11 Po.w11udem 
Times (Walnut C reek, California, 1999); and see Patricia M. Greenfield, "What Psychology Can du for 
Anthropology, or Why Anthropology Took Postmodernism on the Chin," American A111!tropolof!i.v1," 102:3 
(2000), especially 564: " l hope lo convince my readers that the babies of Empiric ism and Generalization 
have not been thrown out wilh the bathwatcrs of Objectivity, Cultural Homogeneity, Fact. Truth, Otherness, 
and Science as Apolitical Enterprise. In sho11, 10 accepl 1/tese laller six a.1·s1m1ptio11s as valid 1arge1s rif 1lie 
pus/modem crilique does 1w/ necessarily email a 111mi11,~ away fivm empirical 111e1!todology; ii does no/ 
necessarily e111ail lhe redejini1io11 of r1111 /11vpologv as Ji1er11111re ralher 1h1m science" (emphasis in the orig-
inal). 
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Jenkins's attempt to sweep history out of serious discourse is, I believe, 
yet another example of such polarized thinking. There is a further funda-
mental self-subversion in Jenkins's approach, one not ignored by 
Zagorin, but demanding more attention - one I have also noticed in the 
arguments of other self-conscious postmodernists such as Elizabeth 
Deeds Ermath and Robert F. Berk:hofer, Jr. This is Jenkins's generally 
unreflexive and highly traditional use of history, in an essay that tri-
umphantly declares an end to the modernist discourse of academic his-
tory as we have known it for at least two centuries. Jenkins certainly does 
not pass for an academic historian; Zagorin rightly criticizes him for 
attacking history while demonstrating little knowledge of how historians 
actually work.7 1 mean that Jenkins bases his whole argument on an unex-
amined sense of postmoderni sm as a complex of ideas developing, 
indeed coming to luxuriant fruition , in time as understood and periodized 
by modernist historians. 
Most of Jenkins's "Reply" concentrates on issues of language, episte-
mology, and on his analysis of antirepresentationalism. But towards the 
end Jenkins openly reveals a breathtaking faith in his own ability to know 
what happened over vast swathes of Western and even World history. 
Jenkins believes that Zagorin fails "to comprehend that we are living in a 
culture wherein it is now too late still to be modern , and where the future 
is no more containable within the di scourses of modernity than the 
'modern epoch' was containable within the di scourses of 'the 
medieval' ." Although he admits to stating this argument "baldly," I am 
still awed at such unreflexive use of old-fashioned, discredited (by 
Jenkins's standards) history as he effortlessly generalizes across 1,500 
years of Western development.8 And, also noted by Zagorin , such appeal 
to assumed major historical "truths" to justify a political/ideological 
argument is surely a classic use of rnetanarrartive, supposedly a cardinal 
7. The same is tm e of Why Histmy. Jenkins examines the work of very few liistoria11s. apan l"rom I Jaydcn 
While, David llarlan, Frank Ankersmit, and - Jenkin 's special target, supposedly rcprcselllalive of "lower 
case" academic historians - Richard Evans. Although in his book Jenkins also cffo11lessly generalizes across 
supposed past developments in Western history, at no time does he analyse how historians have examined a 
major problem, such as rac ial slavery in the Americas. I'd like to suggest a thought experiment: imagine if a 
historian wrote a po lemic against literary critics or philosophers, and hardly touched on the actual work done 
by such scholars. 
8. Jenkins, ' 'Postmodern Reply," 196. 
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sin of modernist historians.9 This is not the first time I have pointed to 
such gross inconsistency by evangelists of the new postmodernist/anti-
history order. 10 But my criticism goes beyond academic pedantry. A vast 
metana.rrative is central to their whole triumphalist view of postmod-
ernism. According to this view, explicit in Jenkins, we in the West passed 
from "the medieval," to modernity (now almost totally discredited), to 
postmodernity with its unimagined imageries and emancipatory, non-his-
torical rhetoric. Indeed the very term "postmodern" is inherently histor-
ical. 
Nor am I picking one of Jenkins's phrases out of context. Postmod-
ernists, he claims, are much less won-ied about the future than Zagorin 
and other espousers of modernity, "given that we have come to an end of 
their 'representationalist' modernity and the end of elements constituting 
it - like their history." One era ends, another emerges: eloquent metanar-
rative, and not a citation in sight to show how its author came to his 
grandiose historical conclusion. 11 Suggesting that "we can wave goodbye 
to history without any nostalgia," Jenkins follows up with history and yet 
more history. "So strong have (modernist) histories been in the formation 
of our culture," he continues, "so central their place in the bourgeois and 
proletarian imagination, that it appears that history per se is a natural phe-
nomenon ... " This, admittedly, is a perceptive historiographical com-
ment; one that historians, steeped in assumptions about the very "nor-
mality" of our views about recovering the past, would do well to contem-
plate. Jenkins follows with another valid criticism that again nicely 
skewers historians because - inexcusably! - we often forget that our dis-
9. Zagorin, "Rejoinder," 203-4. Zagorin wonders too at Jenkins confident knowledge about the ji1111re. 
Zagorin also refers to such postmodernist self-suhversions in "History, the Referent. and Nan-alive," espe-
cially 14-15. For an examination of meta narrative, see Margaret R. Somer, "The Privatization of Citizenship: 
How to Rethink the Knowledge Cullurc," in Beyond the C11/t11ra/ Turn , Bonnell and Hunt, eds ., esp. 130-32. 
Somers see metanarrative as a combination of narrative structure and a positive/negative binary code of social 
naturalness. Such a combination can establish a metanarrative as a powe1ful, often unquestioned - indeed 
11nq11estio11able - "gatekeeper of conceptual authority." 
JU. Michael C. Coleman, "Gut Reactions of a Historian to a Missionary Tract," American Quarterly 50 
(June 1998), 340-48. This was part of a forum on Berkhofer's Beyond the Great Story. I noted nine major 
ways in which Berkhofer subverted his own argument. I feel that in hi.s fornm reply (to me and two other 
scholars), Bcrkhofcr ignored most of my criticisms: "Self-reflections on Beyond the Great S101y: The 
Ambivalent Author as I.ronic Interlocutor," ibid., 365-75. 
11. Jenkins, "Postmodern Reply," 187. 
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cipline too is situated in history. "It is tautological to say so, but it needs 
stressing," he writes, "that we have obviously never seen anything like 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century, Western upper and lower-case gemes 
('histories as we have known them ') at any other time or place. There 
have never been, on any other part of the earth, at any other time, ways of 
historicizing like that." Although I am far more modest in my pronounce-
ments on World history and indeed on the history of every other human 
cultme - "there never have been" - I suspect that Jenkins is right. But this 
is history in the grandest of modernist modes - all in the crusade to inval-
idate modernist history. 12 
And there is more to come: he wonders whether "the possibility of 
emancipation could be rethought after the Enlightenment projects of 
modernity (projects to try to create in bourgeois and proletarian forms 
'human rights communities') could be held to have failed on their own 
terms ... " 13 Beyond, again, the issue of gross historical generalizing, how 
can you ever consider the success or failure of Enlightenment experi-
ments (how can you even mention such historical categorizations - meta-
narratives - as the Enlightenment, bourgeois, and proletarian, which 
Jenkins does not sun-ound by quotation marks?) while rejecti ng the very 
discipline which gave us the concepts through the exercise of empirical 
analysis of sources? Historians of the Enlightenment and class relations 
may all have been misled, but that is not the issue. The issue here and 
throughout his "Reply" is that, while rejecting their very di scourse, 
Jenkins so effortlessly builds his "new" constructi on upon their construc-
tion of that past. 
The umeflexive use by Jenkins, Berkhofer, Ermath, and others of such 
historical "knowledge" suggests an insoluble problem in the postmod-
ernist crusade against metanarrative. To even accuse modernist history of 
12. Ibid., 197-98. Note thal all 1hese quo1a1ions come fro m two consecutive parngraphs. Jenkins may be 
righl in his bold claim 1ha1, in a ccnlury or two, 1he modemist history discourse may appear as " local, tempo· 
rary phenomena that postmodernists s1ar1ed laking apart in lhe late lwcmicth centu1y." But this s1a1emen1 100 
assumes a great deal of tradilinnal historical "knowledge." While reading Why Hi.<101)' I was similarly struck 
by Jenkins's broadly modernist assumptions abom recem trends in Western history, and I quickly 1ired of 
noting particular instances (simi lar to those from his ar1icle quo1ed in my text above) of his sublimely confi-
dent uses of modernist hislory. See, for example, Why HistOI)'. 15, 25, 203-4. I feel thal Hayden White also 
uses traditional history unrcncx ivcly in his rcccnlly publ ished essay colleclion, Fig11ra/ Neali.rnt. 
13. Jenkins, "Postmodern Reply," 196-97. I have to admit 1hat at limes r found Jenkin's argumenl in lhis 
paragraph difficult to follow. 
54 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 34, 2002 
establishing metananatives (which it obviously does: the Enlightenment, 
Progress, the Rise of Science; or, even less fl atte1ing to Westerners: 
Imperialism, the Rise of Race, Fascism, etc), is in itself to establish yet 
new metanarratives. 14 These are just as sweeping, and contain their own 
ideological agendas (not to speak of personal agendas, such as the drive 
for academic status); they are no more neutral than the metananatives 
spawned by us supposedly less reflexive traditional historians. Further if 
"emancipatory" (a favourite term of Jenkins) means liberation from any 
kind of oppression, surely it too is nested in its own metanarrati ve of neg-
ative and positi ve developments and values. I do not argue here for the 
unthinking perpetuation of historical metanarratives about Progress, or 
"the Rise of the West," (with their insidious ideological baggage and 
exclusion of counter-nan-atives). Postmodernists are right in arguing for 
highly critical stances towards all such generalizations. Yet if we are to 
attempt any understanding of the past and present, even the most modest 
and tentative understanding, we have to generalize, to employ narrative, 
and indeed metanarratives - as the writing of Jenkins, Berkhofer, Ermath, 
and indeed Hayden White himself have shown. To reject extreme post-
modernist attacks on "traditional" history is not, therefore, to ignore the 
insight of postmodernists that the unthinking building of metanarratives 
is dangerous; it is to point to the necessity of such generalizing when we 
contemplate the past, while accepting the need for always self-critical use 
of all meta- and indeed micronarratives.15 
Although Jenkins has thus built much of his argument around histor-
ical categories and periodizations (metanarratives) supplied by modernist 
history, he explicitly and derisively rejects thi s whole academic dis-
14. In his review of Ermath's Sequel to HistOI)>, David Carr made a similar cri ticism, Hfaw1y and T/1emy 
32:2 (1993). especially 182-87. Berkhofcr also acknowledges the problem, "Self-Refections," 368-69. 
15. On a smaller scale Jenkins also does good old modernist history. He retrospectively examines his 
mental processes as he began his book, Why His10 1y? lithics a11d Pos1111odemity ( 1999). This whole fasci · 
nating passage (no irony intended) is also ltistmy- autobiography, of course, but history no less, as the author 
contemplates past developments in his own life. fl could be classed as New Social History of an ordinary -
non-elite - person. Indeed, one could argue that Jenkins's analysis of Dell'ida's thinking on language and 
knowledge is a lso history - the history of ideas. as the Derrida texts that Jenkins examines appeared in the 
past. if the recelll past. And when he accepts Derrida's claim that "history doesn't repeat itself' (190) I again 
have to ask: how can we know if we can know nothing about the past? The same re liance on historical narrn· 
live is true of Jenkin's extended analysis of the writings of other poslmodcrnists; l enjoyed his instructive 
analysis (again no irony intended) of Hayden White's work over a number of decades, Why Hiswry, chap. 5. 
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course. "I see no reason why we cannot now gather the strength to rid 
ourselves of ' the burden of history'," he writes, "and construct measures 
of radical emancipation from current imaginaries sans histoire and espe-
cially postmodern ones ... " 16 Disdaining the need to show us what a post-
modernist history might look like, and indeed disdaining the very need 
for any postmodernist history, he an-ives at a denunciation that, I have to 
admit, I savoured despite its contemptuous di smissal of my craft. "From 
the point of view of emancipatory discourse, " he asks, "why hitch your 
future-oriented wagon to a knackered old horse that answers to the name 
of history?" 17 
Why indeed? Why does Jenkins himself, along with others such as 
Ermath and Berkhofer, hitch his triumphalist, visionary postmodernist 
di scourses to such an exhausted old animal? Do these evangelical post-
modernists not subvert their own arguments by doing so? To be fair, 
Jenkins acknowledges the issue of inconsistency or self-subversion. 
Noting how critics try to use a "trump card" against postmodernists - that 
their epistemological sceptici sm undermines their own claims to valid 
knowledge - Jenkins notes nonchalantly that they are aware of the incon-
sistency. Yet "they don' t care. Because it doesn' t matter ... Postmod-
ernists are not weak because they have no foundations because nobody 
has foundations; we are all relativists now, all postmodern now." 18 A wise 
person once said that if you ever achieve a logically consistent argument 
you 've left something out. So we should not hold postmodernists to a 
standard of consistency unattainable by the rest of the human race. But 
surely we can demand greater consistency of thinkers like Jenkins and 
16. Jenkins. Postmodern Rep/)\ 197. 
17. Ibid., 199. 
18. Ibid., 195. Hayden White briefly - and in my view inadequately - discusses the issue of self-s ubver-
sion, Figural Reali.<111, 16-18. While also fails to apply his lit erary critical theories of troping and plot types to 
his own narrn1ives. Although he too continually rc.~orts to "traditionar• history, he can ncvcrlhc lcss be 
scathingly dismissive o r the d iscipline: " Indeed - at least fro m a culturalis t perspective - history is. if any-
thing, even more constructivist and even more naively so than the versions of reality constructed hy the social 
sciences. No other discipline is more informed by the illusion that ' facts' are found in research rather than con-
structed by modes of representation and techniques of discoursivization than is history. No other disc ipline is 
more oblivious to the ' fictionality' of what it takes to be its "data.' That is why no other discipline of the 
human sciences is so resistant to the challenge posed by culturalism to the social sciences. Histm y is the last 
refuge of rhat j(iith i11 com11w11 .vem e that cultura/ism i11 its post111odemis1 i11camatio11 seeks to deconstmct." 
(emphasis added), "Afterword," /Jeymul the Cultural Tum , Bonnell and Hunt, eds., 322. 
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other postmodernists, whose books are systematically organized and 
argued and replete with the formal paraphernalia of academic discourse? 
History is crucial to the whole postmodernist argument, yet Jenkins 
heaps contempt upon a discipline/discourse which is actually far more 
varied, and indeed today more influenced by postmodernist ideas than he 
is aware. He ends with a near-millennial vision of a world sans histoire: 
"the old upper-case metanarratives of yesteryear are now too decrepit and 
discredited to be wheeled out again even as farce, while the lower case -
which once had limited emancipatory ambitions as expressed in Whig 
and progressive forms - has long been politically conservative ... " 19 And 
he relishes a future "at the end of the experiment of the modern" - history 
to the last word almost! - a future full of "new imageries - of surprising 
things to come - [that] may well not include in their number 'histories as 
we have known them' or, even, histories at all."20 
As historians have been the butt of much similar postmodernist con-
tempt in recent years, I have sometimes wondered what we (especially 
the foot-soldiers of the discipline, slogging away in the archival trenches) 
did to deserve it all. Or perhaps I could reverse the denunciation. Post-
modemists validly insist that historians and indeed all scholars need to 
reflect upon and openly declare their location (as male, white, Western, 
privileged, or whatever). Of course historians have hardly been ignorant 
of such issues. For much of the twentieth century they have been aware 
that "each generation writes its own history" and that, in the famous 
phrase of Carl Becker, "each man is his own historian." Yet we should 
concede that, more radically than ever before, postmodernists have 
exploded the scholarly claim to dispassionate neutrality, the classic 
Western presumption that the scientist/scholar can somehow remain 
"outside the experiment." This is surely one of the most valuable of post-
modernist contributions: away with fake, omniscient anonymity, with 
passive constructions and the disguising or erasing of the scholar as 
active, located agent! Therefore I can validly ask postrnodernists like 
19. Jenkins, Postmodern Reply, 198-99. By "Upper case" history, Jenkins means the discredited metanar-
rativcs of modernist consciousness - the Renaissance, Enlightenment, the Rise of the West, Progress. By 
"lower case" history he means the more carefully-focused contemporary academic practices of the profession, 
see Why Hist01)'?, 15. Both arc deeply discreditctl in his eyes. 
20. Jenkins, Postmodem Reply, 200. 
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Jenkins and Berkhofer to examine their location too. Why the animus 
against a discipline which is itself continually changing; and which, from 
my reading of hi storical literature in many fields, is becoming far more 
aware of the need for self-questioning? Because of academic history's 
roots in the Enlightenment? But how can postmodernists know of such 
roots? As far as I am aware, historians do not refer to other disciplines -
Literary criticism, for example, or sociology or anthropology or philos-
ophy - as "knackered old horses." We are not shouting at them to change 
their ways and certainly not attempting to banish them from academic 
discourse, nor are we aggressively evangelizing to turn postmodernists 
into modernist historians. So, what is it about you that makes you so 
upset by us? Turn self-cri ticism upon yourselves, as you preach at us to 
do. Most of this resentment against postmodernists like Jenkins is, I 
admit, defensive. It is the defensiveness of the supposedly deficient 
"savage" in face of the overweening hubris of the missionary in posses-
sion of "the Truth". Because - irony of ironies for those who so publicly 
denounce believers in modernist ''Truths" - Jenkins and other postmod-
ernist advocates radiate conviction that they possess a superior "Truth."21 
Even if they claim that I have misread them on the issue of reliance 
upon history and on their own metanarratives (can an anti.representa-
tional postmodernist claim to have been misread?) it wou ld be difficult 
indeed to misread Jenkins's contempt for our form of academic discourse 
and his joyous anticipation of a future sans histoire. Indeed, he is as 
sweepingly confident in his knowledge of the future as about the past. 
Even if he is ri ght about that future - back in the 1960s and 1970s, I 
recall, there were times when the Western capitalist order did appear to 
be the reced ing wave of the past and socialism in some form the 
advancing wave of the future - will the world really be a better place 
without carefu l academic history? Would we really be more "emanci-
pated" if historians had never attempted to study - and from now on 
cease to study - the institution of racial slavery in the United States, for 
21. See, for example, Jenkins's conremptuous reference in Why Histoty, 199: "For there is more at stake in 
life than the hegemonic continuation of an ideologically positioned set of guild practices reified by their pro-
fessional benefidaries into tablets of stone." Having subjected myself to his article and book in short order, I 
claim - at the risk of "speaking for the Other" - to sense whal il fol l like to be an American Indian or other 
"heathen savage" racing endless denunciation by unreflexively assured missionaries . (And see note 25, 
below). 
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example, and the events leading to the actual emancipation of slaves? If 
by "emancipation" Jenkins means liberation from all kinds of oppression, 
why can attempting to learn more about the oppression of African Amer-
icans in the near or distant past not be emancipatory in hi s postmodernist 
sense of the term? This is not to claim that historians have given us one 
obje<:tively true account of such developments. Any scholar who 
attempts to publish or even reads historical literature knows just how 
contentious all theories and narratives are; anonymous referees and 
public reviewers for even fairly traditional history journals endlessly crit-
icise and contest and revise. That, and not complacent stasis, is the way 
many historians work. But would it be a better, more emancipated world 
if our knowledge of American slavery came from Hollywood 's version of 
"Gone With the Wind" or from "The Patriot" - or if we just forgot about 
slavery altogether?22 
Will the world be better, in other words, without a discipline dedicated 
to the careful sifting of always problematic evidence and the concomitant 
questioning of all kinds of popular and hegemonic national/cultural 
mythology? To take an example from the history of my own country, Ire-
land: will the future of Northern Ireland be more "emancipated" if aca-
demic historians quit the field and leave "history" to postmodernist imag-
inaries or to the myth-mongers on all sides of a di vided community? (I'm 
tempted to admit here that, in Ireland's case, forgetting hi story might just 
be a good thing).23 Of course, many non-academic Irish men and women 
are quite capable of getting beyond the myths which fuel ethnic bitterness 
there. But we can surely claim that over the past half century or so, the 
careful work of academic historians on all sides, many not Iri sh, has to 
22. Nol all scholars acccpl !he inherencly emancipalory implicacions of postmodemism. Gerald Hollon 
pnints to possibly fascist tendencies in postmodernist anti-rationalism. "The Rise or Postmodernisms and the 
' End of Science'," .lnumal of the Histo1y of Ideas 61 :2 (April 2000): 327-41; also, Rairnln Plccha, "Modern 
and Posunodern Racism: Dialogic Approach and Anti-Racist Pedagogies, Hmwml Ed11catio11al Review 69:2 
(Summer 1999): 150-71. 
23. Since fi rst writing this somewhat facei ious - but despairing - comment. I came upon the following 
conclusion by Stephen Howe, whose study is generally critical of postcolonial/posunodcmisl arguments: 
" ... 1he main lesson for modern Ireland may be the need, in searching for soltllions, simply to dismiss argu-
ments puq1orting to derive from historical origin~ and sclllcmcnl patterns, ancestries and ancestral claims ... ," 
Jrelt111d and £111pire: Coln11ial Legacies in Irish Histo1y and C11/111re (New York, 2000), 237. On the problem-
atic re lationships belween ll"ish people and history/myth, sec also Brian Walker, Dt111ci11g IO Hist01y'.1· T1111e: 
HislOI)', Myth and Politics i11 lrela11d (Belfast 1996). 
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some extent broken down the myths and stereotypes and slogans of Irish 
history ("England used the Great Famine to exterminate the Irish," e tc). I 
may not agree with all the arguments of these various revisionist schools, 
but one thing is certain to me: academic history problematizes, asks "how 
do we know this?" and similar questions which deflate myths of "Other" 
and "them." It suggests, above all, the complexity of historical develop-
ments, to the extent that we can know anything about them. Even an 
occurrence as hon-endously evil as the Holocaust calls for more than con-
demnation from historians; it cans for attempts to understand how it 
could happen - to seek for complexity again. Will the world be better if 
academics no longer systematically concern themselves with such 
things? How can we better learn about them - and Jenkins et al. are no 
help here - except through careful, but always epistemologically humble, 
empirical research into their origins, development, and later influences? 
For another thing is also clear to me: people will use history ; they will 
keep telling innocent and/or ideologically loaded stories about the past, 
irrespective of postmodernist protest. What the world needs, then, is not 
necessarily more history, but more good (myth- and metanarrative-ques-
tioning) history. 
If Jenkins demonstrates little awareness of how historians work, he 
demonstrates even less about the explosion of potentially emancipatory 
history that academics have produced during the last three or four 
decades of the twentieth century. The New Social History - leavened, I 
concede, by postmodernist/ poststructuralist/postcolonial concerns with 
issues such as power and "empowerment." - has attempted to bring the 
"outs" into historical discourse. By the "outs" I mean ordinary individ-
uals and groups till then ignored by academic historians: colonized peo-
ples, women, slaves, and other such non-Dead White Males. Ironically, 
Jenkins misses a major issue here: until a few decades ago it appeared 
that these groups had no history! They were sans histoire in hi s sense, of 
being absent from academic discourse. Through the systematic efforts of 
male and female, white and non-white historians, the "outs" at last have 
come into history - only to be threatened with expulsion from it again by 
supposedly emancipated postmoclernists ! Will forgetting hist my be more 
or less emancipat01y for women, African Americans, and other such pre-
viously "invisible" groups, whose present struggles are at least partly 
just{fied through constructed histories of oppression (generally justified 
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constructions, I believe? Of course this is a complex and potentially dan-
gerous issue, and seeking a "usable past" can easily involve the abuse of 
hi story and, in some cases, a self-serving cultivation of "victimhood." 
Yet, if postmodernists oppose racism, patriarchy and all forms of oppres-
sion, can they advocate a wilful amnesia about the past in which, even 
they appear to believe, such oppression occurred? 
My own major field, American Indian history, has gone th.rough a veri-
table revolution in consciousness in these decades. No longer content to 
see Indian peoples as merely passive victims (or, in older discourses, as 
"primitive savages,") male and female historians, some of them (regret-
tably few) Native Americans, have produced a growing body of work in 
which Indian individuals and groups emerge as active participants in their 
own histories . These studies show Indians interacting with white Ameri-
cans and often influencing historical developm.ents, rather than passively 
being influenced by them. In my sub-field of Indian education, historians 
have attempted to get beyond "top down" studies of assimilationist policy 
and staff practices at United States government and missionary schools, 
and to examine from the "bottom up" how Indian children, parents, and 
communities reacted to and sometimes forced changes in white-imposed 
schooling. Through the use of correspondence, official records, oral and 
published interviews, autobiography and other such sources, these histo-
rians have sought the voices of Indians young and old.24 Of course, non-
Indian historians must avoid the temptation to "speak for the Other" - I 
admit to having been culpably ignorant of this whole controversy until, 
less than a decade ago, I became belatedly aware that postmodernists, 
postcolonialists, and American lndian people themselves had begun to 
confront scholars claiming to interpret "them" to us.25 Many of the conclu-
24. See, for example. Michael C. Coleman, J\ 111erico11 /11dia11 Children a11d the School, 1850-1930 
(fackson, Mississippi, 1993). Recently l have added a comparative perspecti ve: "The Responses of' American 
Indian Children and Irish Children to the School, 1850s- 1920s," J\111eriw11 /11dia11 Quarterly 23 (Summer & 
Fall 1999), 83- 112. This article contains references to recent related scholarship. For a study by a Native 
American scholar thal util izes the correspondence of Indian parcnls, school pupils, and white educators lo 
build a powerful sense of the Bureau of Indian A ff ai rs school as aj(1mily concern, see Brenda Child, /Jomdi11g 
Sc/tool Seasons: America11 !11dit111 Families (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1998). Child is a Minnesota Ojibwe. 
25. l have aucmpted to address this issue in M ichael C. Coleman, "To Speak For/Aboul lhe Olhcr: Or 10 
Contemplate One' s Own (Dceentered) Navel?", / 11 Search ofa Co11ti11ew: A North A111erica11 Swdies Ody.1»1·ey. 
Fesctschrift in Honor of Professor Markku Henriksson 's 50th Anniversary, Edi ted by Mikko Saikku, Maarika 
To ivonen & Mikko Toivoncn (Helsinki, Fin land, 1999), 14-28. 
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sions of the New Social History may be overturned by later historians. 
And some of the initially emancipatory perspectives outlined above may 
too easily solidify into hegemonic orthodoxies - but is this not true of all 
emancipatory discourses, including those produced by postmodernist? 
Also, I have elsewhere argued that New Social History approaches can 
over-emphasize the creative power of the "outs" and thus underplay the 
formidably oppressive power of the "ins." Who, during the nineteenth 
century, held the preponderance of pon1er in North America: scattered 
Indian peoples or the United States government and the expanding white 
population ?26 
Even if traditional historians cope with such potential problems 
to their own satisfaction and to that of referees and reviewers, post-
modernists may still fault them for the supposedly inherent failings of 
the whole enterpdse. Beyond the issue of "speaking for the Other," his-
torians may essentialize Native American peoples, replacing their kalei-
doscopic variety with an ideologically constructed Eurocentric re-
presentation of "The Indian." Such studies are still obviously under-
taken in the Enlightenment (Eurocentric, hegemonic) tradition of 
rational empirical research, argued in generally clear and unproblema-
ti zed language that supposedly mediates directly between reality and 
researcher or reader. Although Michel Foucualt and Hayden White may 
rece.ive the odd nod of recognition, the above studies, my own included, 
are generally little influenced by the famous postmodernist "linguistic 
turn." 
But why should that fundamentally invalidate them or their findings, 
in the sense of ruling their very effort futile? If, as postmodernists 
preach, there are no final truths or standards, no canons of any sort, 
why are such traditional approaches not equally valid or invalid even 
Lo posLmodernisLs ? The writers of the New Social History or its 
New Indian History variant claim no final truths, they merely present 
and contest tentative findings. Further, at least a number of the studies 
26. Michael C. Coleman, "The Symbiotic Embrace: American Indians, White Educators and the School, 
1850-1930," Histwy of Education 25 ( 1996), 1- 18. For a more recent expression of this problem. see Susan 
Pedersen, "The Future of Feminist History," Perspectives: American Historical Auociario11 Newsletter 38:7 
(Octohcr 2000): 22-25. 
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in my own field are produced by Native American men and women, 
some of whom are major contributors to the new Indian history. They 
and non-Indian historians powerfully depict both the variety and the 
changing nature of Indian experiences; even studies focused on partic-
ular Indian groups or individual schools leave little doubt as to the great 
diversity of Indian experiences - and the experiences of white officials 
and teachers working with them. Also, despite broad agreement on the 
outlines of United States government educational practices and Indian 
responses, there is contestation within the field: for example, scholars 
do not agree on whether theories of biological racism become more 
prevalent among government officials from around 1900; and even if 
they did, to what extent was this reflected in the everyday experiences 
of Indian pupils? Despite the general use of relatively simple and 
jargon-free language, these studies do not suggest that the cross-cultural 
educational experience was itself simple; in one way or another they all 
convey the complexity, anguish , and sometimes the achievements of 
those placed in schools constructed by an outside ethnic authority.27 
As regards our unsophisticated, "undeconstructed" use of language -
are we really any different from postmodernists? Although they some-
times resort to fri ghtfully difficult language (from the perspective of 
this plain-speaking historian); and although Jenkins, in particular, 
delights in proclaiming his commitment to antirepresentationalism, he 
and they continue to write and to publish with the assumption that at 
least some other scholars will understand their words and ideas. And 
(I am not the first to point this out) they all put their own names on 
their works. When Keith Jenkins allows "Keith Jenkins" to appear 
under the title of his "Postmodern Reply," he is hardly being antirepre-
sentational. 
None of this is to deny the real importance of postmodernist criticisms 
27. On this issue I concur with Henry Ashby Turner. ill: "Some advocates of what are now fashionably 
rcgartlctl as more sophisticated modes of scholarship seem to believe that producing an accurate narrative of 
past events that accounts for their causes is child 's play, a simple task unsuitable for g reat minds. But anyone 
who has ever undertaken the taxing task of recons tructing a complex chapter of past happenings knows how 
na'ive that notion is," "Human Agency anti Tmpersonal Determinants in histo rical Causation: /\ Response (() 
David Lindcnfic ld," llisto1y a11d Theory 38:3 ( 19 99): 302. I yuibble only with the wort! " reconstruct" ; we 
"construct," I fee l. 
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of traditional history. We have to concede that in the last few decades 
postmodernists have pushed some of us to ask deeper questions than 
heretofore about our assumptions and methods and about the very nature 
of knowledge. Nor have we the right to claim that academic hi story -
broadly understood - is the only valid way to come to grips with the past. 
But, along with postmdernists, we too have acted under the assumption 
that "emancipation" involves Lhe openiug of the mind, the recognition of 
previously "invisible" groups, and opposition to racial and other forms of 
oppression. So surely it is not too much to claim that, at least in some of 
its concerns and production, the New Social History was and still is a 
wonderfully emancipat01y discourse, and the world would have been 
worse off without it? 
To the extent that Jenkins and other postmodernist proselytisers call for 
reflexivity and self-criticism from hi storians; to the extent that they decry 
"radical positivist" claims that historians can objectively reconstruct the 
past (rather than carefully construct a tentative account of it); to the 
extent that they oppose all forms of academic, scientific arrogance and 
Western claims to epistemological superiority over "primitive" and non-
Western peoples - to the extent that postmodernists like Jenkins call for 
such things I'll certainly shake his and their hands (if they' 11 lower them-
selves to shaking mine). Unfortunately, the world we have inherited 
throbs with racial, ethnic, national , gender, class, and other contentions. 
Will we really be better off without men and women from many nations 
who search for and carefully analyse the surviving evidence relating to 
such divisions, destined never to get beyond fragile, tentative, complex, 
but always contested understandings of them? 
Jenkins, ironically, has answered my question. Sneer as he may at the 
old horse, he has still hitched his "new" vision to it. And, even more 
important, he and other postmodernist critics of history still need that 
old horse to pull along the argument that the horse itself is dead. But 
why "horse" in the singular? I suggest that this further betrays Jenkin's 
simplistic understandi ng - and he is not alone in that - of academic his-
tory as a discourse rather than as multiple, changing, contending dis-
courses. To extend the equine metaphor: some of the horses of history, 
such as radical positivism, may well be ready for the knacker 's yard , 
and I'll help him lead that one there. Others are alive and well, thank 
you - look at the book reviews, advertisements for new publications, 
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and new article and dissertation listings in history journals every quarter. 
And still others are beautiful, rearing wild horses, emancipated and 
emancipating!28 
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